The move to 'resilience' language in local security planning has created innovative possibilities for governing communities in the UK through an emphasis on local, voluntary participation.
After the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, the term 'resilience' has come to define the UK's approach to securing British lives and infrastructure from both natural and man-made threats (Lentzos and Rose, 2009; Coaffee and Rogers, 2008) . The government's 'Community Resilience Programme', the final phase of which was rolled out by the UK Cabinet Office from March 2011, sought to make this pre-emptive security the responsibility of community groups. Rather than coping with major terrorist attacks or viral outbreaks, this programme focused on bouncing back from more prosaic emergencies such as flooding. I argue that through this agenda, resilience has become an important tactic not only in governing, managing and controlling communities, but in seeking to produce them in the first place. Following Michel Foucault, I understand 'government' to mean all the diverse ways in which individuals, organisations and groups throughout society direct, change and control the actions and behaviours of themselves and others (see Foucault 2002, 341; also 2004; . As Colin Gordon (1991, 2-3) has noted such governmentality can be used in 'both a wide and a narrow sense'; I use it in an inclusive way to mean the use of different types of power (sovereign, disciplinary, pastoral, and so on) by a range of actors 'to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons'. We can see this in the stated aim of the community resilience programme as producing 'cultural and behavioural change across the country' (Cabinet Office [CO] 2011a: 15) . The programme thus aims to be creative but also to diffuse techniques and tactics of government through a discourse of community empowerment.
The first section of the article draws out these processes through a critical reading of the key products the Cabinet Office has prepared, especially its 'Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience' (CO 2011a), the 'Guide for Communities ' (CO 2011b) , the 'Toolkit' (CO 2011c) and 'Template' (CO 2011d) for resilience planning. In offering this reading I aim to make a limited intervention in a specific programme and its understanding of resilience. The Cabinet Office's materials were chosen because they are a discrete example of this government department's role as the key coordinator and interpreter of the resilience discourse with regard to communities. As such, the argument I make cannot necessarily be generalised across UK resilience programmes. These texts and policy frameworks are read as what Roxanne Lyn Doty (1993, 302) calls 'discursive practices', intertextual constructions which work to fix the meaning of concepts such as 'resilience' and 'community'. These Cabinet Office materials are not commands or inventions of central government but governmentalizing intertexts: the product of three years (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) of consultation and 'learning from those already engaged in community resilience activities ' (CO 2011a, 15) . Reading them as discursive practices means paying attention to the way the community resilience programme exercises power to 'create various kinds of subjects and simultaneously position these subjects vis-á-vis one another' (Doty 1993, 303) in relations of hierarchy, responsibility, subordination and marginalisation. My reading aims to draw out these productive power relations, revealing them as contestable and problematic. The interpretation I offer is itself contingent and disputable, but it operates within a certain understanding of 'advanced liberal' techniques of government (see, for example, Dillon and Reid 2001; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 2000a) . The second section then suggests two problems with this use of community resilience in its highly selective understanding of the term, ignoring the apparent centrality of poverty and equality to resilience, as well as the violence inherent in community. Though the resistance of government is not the focus of this article, both of these problems illustrate the fact way that the community resilience agenda will inevitably be countered by those managed through it. Nonetheless, it may well be that the framework is more successful as a tactic of government than as a way of ensuring communities' adaptation following disasters.
PRODUCING AND GOVERNING COMMUNITIES
Ostensibly resilience is unrelated to government and governing. According to the UK Cabinet Office (2011a, 4), resilience is a capacity which enables a system to 'adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure and identity' (definition taken from Edwards, 2009 ).
Resilience is thus not about prevention but accepting that, as the 'Guide' puts it: 'Emergencies happen' (CO 2011b, 2) . It involves accepting that disasters are inevitable, and the best that can be done is to 'bounce back' by adapting to the new circumstances. This understanding of 'resilience' is both questionable and has developed from contestable premises (see Walker and Cooper 2011) . But my concern is with how resilience is being used in this particular context and more specifically what it aims to produce. A definition of specifically community resilience is offered by the Cabinet Office as the abilities of local people and groups to harness 'local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency ' (2011a, 4) . What distinguishes community resilience in this material therefore is that the assignment of a subject of resilience includes a transfer of agency and responsibility. Organising the immediate response to, and recovery from a disaster, traditionally the role of central and local government, is shifted to local individuals, groups and agencies. To claim that this programme outlines the production and government of community (through) resilience is counterintuitive: government appears to withdraw itself in this agenda; communities are presupposed rather than created.
We can, however, see the productive aspect in the first step towards resilience recommended by both the 'Guide' and the 'Toolkit': to set about 'identifying your community ' (CO 2011c, 3) . One should start the whole process by 'considering who your community is and which communities you belong to ' (CO 2011b, 9; 2011c, 3) . Thus while the agenda is very much based upon the assumption of pre-existing communities -and we are explicitly warned that this is 'not about creating or identifying a whole new community network' (CO 2011b, 8) -its initial concern is nonetheless precisely such creation. In other words, its first aim is to generate affective ties, a sense of 'belonging' -what I am calling the production of community. After all, one's community cannot be straightforward or obvious if one has to ponder its identity or existence, while the first step to its resilience is establishing the idea of belonging which appears to be its hallmark. Of course, such a production will inevitably interact, reinforce and at times conflict with other community building/generating policies and programmes, both from government and beyond (see Office for Civil Society 2010).
On the one hand, the 'Framework' especially demonstrates a praise-worthy awareness of the complexity of community, noting several different 'types', from geographical, to communities of 'interest', 'circumstance' and 'supporters' (CO 2011a, 11-12) . While all the documents note that community involves 'people linked by a common bond', geographical communities are held to be the 'obvious choice for, and primary beneficiary of, community resilience' (CO 2011a, 12; 2011b, 9) . While on the one hand commendable, on the other this discussion betrays a lack of certainty and assurance about precisely what community is. Officially sanctioned community resilience guidance and assessments in other countries displays no such hesitation. For instance, an Australian response to a series of disasters in Victoria in the late 1990s, which sought to assess and make recommendations on personal and communal resilience and vulnerability, acknowledged the complexity of community but treated it as self-evidently a geographically defined social aggregation or network of individuals and groups (see Buckle, Marsh and Smale 2001, 12; 34) . Some manuals on community resilience contain almost no discussion of 'community', while others identify it simply by geographical area.
1 All appear sure they know what it is. What is interesting in the UK approach is that community construction -creating belonging -rather than its perpetuation appears the purpose of resilience. Thus, though disaster management literature acknowledges that community development unconnected to risk and threat automatically increases a community's resilience (for a discussion, see Paton and Johnston 2001, 274) , the UK guidelines reverse the relation: building resilience becomes a way of constructing community.
Of course, the processes of production and government of communities cannot be fully separated and is not necessarily a top-down process. It is continually stressed that central government's role is one of 'motivating' and 'incentivising' (CO 2011a, 6), 'supporting' and 'enabling' communities to help themselves (Ibid, 7), 'inviting' rather than demanding participation (Ibid, 9), and 'sharing good practice' (Ibid, 13). Rather, creating communities through resilience also produces the subjects and hierarchies through which power will be exercised. It is noted that the second step towards community resilience in the 'Guide' and 'Toolkit' is the identification of local relationships, networks and people who can become involved in resilience (CO 2011b, 9; 2011c, 3) , while the third and fourth involve establishing a 'community representative' to take charge of the emergency plan (CO 2011b, 10), along with coordinators and a 'Community Emergency Group' (CO 2011c, 4). The programme ultimately suggests a hierarchical positioning of different subjects: resilience 'champions', 'experts', 'volunteers', 'resilient individuals' and, at the bottom, the 'vulnerable'.
The separation and relation between such identities is part of producing a community that can more easily be governed and govern itself. At the top of this hierarchy is the 'community representative', or community resilience 'champion' for the 'Framework' (CO 2011a, 15 encourage and offer advice, yet without any statutory responsibility to help local groups (CO 2011a, 14-15) .
A more central figure for the constitution of community as well as its resilience and government is the figure of the 'volunteer'. It is stressed throughout that participation in the community resilience programme must be without compulsion or coercion, as it merely aims to 'set out the possible benefits' of resilience (CO 2011a, 5) . This is a key aspect of the shift to governmentality, where power operates through freedom and empowerment rather than force or diktat (Foucault 2007, 46-47) . Nonetheless volunteers are absolutely necessary: they do the footwork of resilience planning and action. While it is 'often spontaneous', volunteering clearly requires management,
advice on which appears in the 'Toolkit' (CO 2011c, 7). Together the resilience 'champion' and 'volunteers' form a kind of idealised 'resilient individual', a collection of which make up a resilient community (CO 2011a, 15) . The resilient individual has 'taken steps to make their homes and families more resilient… are aware of their skills, experience and resources and how to deploy these to best effect during emergencies'. They are 'actively involved in influencing and making decisions affecting them' and 'take an interest in their environment and act in the interest of the community to protect assets and facilities' (CO 2011a, 15) . This is what the programme aims to produce -individuals who have internalised the norms of community and resilience to manage and conduct the behaviour and actions of themselves and their community more efficiently and effectively.
The final figure, at the base of this governmental hierarchy, is that from whom no such resilience can be expected: the 'vulnerable'. While it is acknowledged that 'Emergencies can make anyone vulnerable' (CO 2011c, 4), some are clearly more so than others and will require extra help from volunteers and champions. Those explicitly identified as 'vulnerable' are those who have recently had an operation, the old, those without transport, with limited mobility, transient groups and those who might find emergency information difficult to understand (CO 2011c, 6 ). This subject is one that is lacking something, thus expectations of normal (resilient) behaviour do not applyrather, they are used to orient and direct the behaviour of the normal. Vulnerability also demonstrates the way in which resilience is being used to both govern and produce the community through the stress placed upon knowing and producing knowledge about it. A key aspect of the 'Toolkit' is 'collecting information', especially about who is vulnerable: 'This requires local knowledge and your help' (CO 2011c, 4). The 'Template' offered for a Community Emergency
Plan contains a section to list organisations that may be helpful in identifying the vulnerable (CO 2011d, 9). Local skills and resources are continually assessed, as are potential risks and locations of 'safety' (CO 2011d, 4-6) . This mundane gathering and disseminating of information is an important way in which a community is made knowable, visible, calculable and thus more easily regulated (Inda 2006, 6) .
Though aimed at times of crisis and emergency, this mentality of government, or 'conduct of conduct' (Gordon 1991, 2) Through a variety of techniques then, the Community Resilience agenda targets the production and government of community. Key to the agenda is the way resilient individuals are advised to firstly consider who their community is, actively creating it through the steps they then take to resilience. Gathering knowledge, for instance, constitutes community as an object and subject, as well as being part of its management. The categorisation and hierarchical placing of subjects allows for more efficient direction of conduct, as do drills and rehearsals of emergency plans. In this way, every resilient individual governs themselves and others. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-resilience-case-study-library), clear causal relations cannot be firmly established. What we can say is that this programme's implementation, as with any operation of power, will inevitably be redirected, resisted and countered (Foucault 2007, 196 . But what are the problems and inconsistencies of this approach from which counter-conducts may arise? And what is at stake here?
SELECTIVE RESILIENCE? POVERTY AND VIOLENCE
The UK's Community Resilience programme certainly represents an innovative attempt to bring emergency services and experts together with local volunteers and groups in the creation and management of safer, more adaptable locales. As part of the coalition government's wider 'Big Society' agenda (CO 2011a, 17; 22), the aim is thus for individuals and communities to take more responsibility for themselves, their own safety and security (Cameron, 2011 ; for more on the link to the Big Society, see Bulley and Sokhi-Bulley, forthcoming) . In this section I seek to interrogate and disturb the key aspects of this programme: its ignorance of poverty and inequality as hallmarks of vulnerability and its treatment of community as an unproblematic 'good'.
Poverty and Inequality
As noted above, part of the way community is created and governed through resilience is the hierarchical placing of the resilient individual above the vulnerable individual. The vulnerable are incapable of resilience, relying on the knowledge and organisation of champions and volunteers.
But this conception of vulnerability, that which lacks resilience, is both limited and limiting. It is limited to the aged, the ill, the immobile, the non-English speaking and the transient. However, for much of the wider literature regarding emergency and disaster management, vulnerability is in large part the 'product of social inequalities -those social factors that influence the susceptibility of various groups to harm and that also govern their ability to respond' (Cutter et al. 2003, 243) .
These include gender, racial and socio-economic inequalities, though the latter tends to be emphasized because the poor cannot as easily rebuild, relocate, or replace lost food, and goods (Coles and Buckle 2004, 98) . The most important indicator explaining or predicting vulnerability within a community, then, is 'socio-economic status', defined as 'income, political power and prestige' and measured by per capita income (Cutter et al. 2003, 245 and 251) . A great number of other factors feed into this notion of vulnerability (including occupation and education), but all other aspects are heightened when someone is poor (Yarnal 2007, 250-251) . The poor simply have the fewest resources to cope with disasters (Maguire and Hagan 2007, 17; Paton and Johnston 2001, 272) ; as Godschalk (2003, 140) puts it, their lives 'are the most constrained'.
Equally, the most resilient communities have the greatest 'resource equity' and are most likely to see each member helping others out in emergencies (Norris et al. 2008, 137) .
We can see the interaction of race and socio-economic inequality in studies of the vulnerability and resilience of individuals and communities in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Before and during the crisis those in the poorer (and generally 'blacker') areas had more to fear from looters, but less access to information, evacuation plans, transportation and found it harder to fund their family's evacuation (Yarnal 2007, 251-252) . But the ability to 'bounce back', to adapt in order to sustain levels of function -the very definition of resilience for the UK Cabinet
Office -was also far more difficult for the poor and black. To bounce back one needs a job, but in New Orleans working class blacks where seven times more likely to have lost their job after Katrina than the average white worker (Elliott and Pais 2006, 317) . Not only were poverty and inequality problems which severely hampered the city's resilience (see official study by Colten et al. 2008, 25) , by not focusing policy on raising standards of living and equality in the aftermath greater resilience will remain elusive (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 154) .
In the end, it is likely that the most vulnerable people of New Orleans will be the last to recover, will have the least capacity to adapt and to reduce their future exposure and sensitivity, and therefore will continue to be the most vulnerable. Those people are mostly black and almost all poor. Is it enough to "put right again" an inequitable system that maintains classic differences in vulnerability, or are there ways we can use recovery to improve both the physical and human systems to reduce vulnerability overall and, in particular, in the most vulnerable parts of the system? (Yarnal 2007, 253) Recognising poverty and inequality as the number one source of community vulnerability and lack of resilience illustrates what is at stake in the UK's programme and confirms Walker and Cooper's (2011, 145) claims of a close proximity between emergent discourses of resilience and contemporary neoliberalism. Why are poverty and inequality entirely absent from the community resilience agenda? Because this would require local and central government spending and policies targeting 'equity in hazard vulnerability, focusing on poorer areas' of the community (Godschalk 2003, 141) . But being part of the coalition's 'Big Society', which follows on from New Labour's 'Third Way', the aim of the agenda is rather to make local people themselves responsible for their own resilience. This is a 'double movement of autonomization and responsibilization'
where communities and individuals are granted freedom within certain limits, but made morally and financially responsible for their own success and failure (Rose 2000a (Rose , 1400 ). Pelling thus asks: 'Why should the vulnerable, many of whom have to expend their resources, time and energy just getting by, be expected to plan for future uncertainties and risk? For many individuals and households this is a non-question -they simply cannot' (Pelling 2003, 164) . Such noncompliance becomes an inevitable and inescapable form of failure for, and resistance to, the programme. This is not to patronise the poor or treat them as objects without agency (Chandler 2012 ). Rather it is to suggest that the possibility and futurity of floods and pandemics cannot rate high on a priority list in relation to immediate economic concerns of the most poor. The communal solidarity of the Community Resilience agenda therefore works less to generate conditions for 'bouncing back' from disaster and more to manage expectations and behaviour in a neoliberal political economy of government which aims 'at accomplishing more through a lesser exertion of force and authority' (Gordon 1991, 24) by 'governing at a distance' (Rose 2000b, 48-9) .
Violence and Community
The second aspect of the programme that I wish to trouble is the treatment of community as a benign and unproblematic 'good'. While exhibiting a lack of assurance about what community is, it appears as benevolent and nonthreatening. It is a good to be developed, retained and resurrected after an emergency. This relies upon an outdated, romantic, united and 'unitary' conception of community (Edwards 1997, 831) . We have already noted the existence of racial It could be argued that Northern Ireland is a special case in this regard. But in fact, it is far less exceptional than it appears. In research and case studies on resilience Pelling (2003, 177) found that communities always show signs of heterogeneity and competition as well as cooperation.
Even the type of idyll the programme seems to rely upon is riven with power relations and disunity. As Delanty (2010, 28) notes, one of the first anthropological studies of a fairly homogenous rural community in Wales (Frankenberg's 1957, Village on the Border) 'emphasized conflict and social divisions around class, gender and ethnicity as a feature of the life of the community'. Certainly we can say that 'community', whatever it is, will always include that within it which resists being contained and put to work for a unitary purpose (see Nancy 1991) . Of course, feminists have long shown that power and violence are inherent in apparently 'safe' places such as the home and community. Sara Ahmed goes further, arguing that a type of structural violence is foundational to the possibility of community. She explores 'Stranger
Danger' campaigns and 'Neighbourhood Watch' schemes, themselves an early type of small-scale community resilience through accepting responsibility for a particular locale.
The projection of danger onto the figure of the stranger allows violence to be figured as exceptional and extraordinary -as coming from outside the protective walls of the home, family, community or nation. As a result, the discourse of stranger danger involves a refusal to recognise how violence is structured by, and legitimated through, the formation of home and community as such. (Ahmed 2000, 36) Community is structurally produced through the figure of the stranger being violently excluded.
It thus relies upon exclusion, suspicion and the creation of danger. But the issue of the stranger brings us full circle then, back to the creation of community. Part of the reason that the Community Resilience programme fails to be compelling is perhaps that it lacks such a stranger as threat. Rather, most often in the programme's material the danger appears impersonal, especially in the shape of extreme weather conditions: all except one of the 'case-studies' of good practice in the 'Guide' (CO 2011b) refer to flooding disasters. This ignorance of the violence within communities and the lack of a 'stranger' figure puts the Community Resilience programme in the awkward position of pursuing two options: firstly it seeks to generate fear of impersonal forces in children and adults through the use of information campaigns and public education like the 'What if…?' website (www.whatif-guidance.org); and secondly, it actively requires and needs disasters and emergencies to occur in order to generate the necessary motivation for volunteering and participation. Thus, in an ironic twist, the ability to produce and govern community (through) resilience ends up necessitating the disastrous circumstances it ostensibly secures against.
CONCLUSION
Resilience is a term that has been used in a great variety of ways across a range of disciplines (Walker and Cooper, 2011) . Calls for greater consensus have been heard especially from the disaster management arena (see Manyena, 2006) . Additionally, the subject of resilience (what is it that is to be resilient) has been heterogeneously defined. While security literature appears to have focused on cities (see Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee et al., 2009; Godschalk, 2003; Pelling, 2003; Vale and Campanella, 2005) , interest has spread to the resilience of non-urban communities (Chandler, 2012) . Similarly, while social psychology has tended to focus on individuals and families, demonstrating 'very little knowledge regarding community resilience' (Kimhi and Shamai, 2004: 441) , this concentration has also developed (for an introduction to this literature see Norris et al. 2008) . In official reports, policies and assessments, community resilience is also being used in diverse ways across the US (Gurwitch et al. 2007; Colten et al. 2008) , Canada (Centre for Community Enterprise 2000) and Australia (Buckle et al 2001) . This generates a large interdisciplinary literature which appears to have been only selectively consulted by the UK's agenda.
What is distinctive about the UK Community Resilience programme, from its initial phase of 'learning' from community groups in November 2008, through the formation of a range of materials, to consultation and assessment in late 2011? I have argued that this approach is fundamentally about producing and governing community behaviour through the development of resilience. The passing over of responsibility to local volunteers, 'champions' and organisations is not about empowerment per se, but forming subjects, placing them in a hierarchy, drilling (and scaring) them into more manageable, directable (and resilient) individuals and communities. This is about spreading a mentality of government throughout society, channelling and guiding behaviour 'at a distance' (Rose 2000b, 48-9) . While highly tuned, I suggested that this attempt was hamstrung by the romantic view of community on which it is based, as well as by the necessity of the emergencies it seeks to counter.
But to what end is this behaviour change oriented? What is at stake here? I suggest that the ignorance of poverty and inequality as a (if not the) major cause of vulnerability and lack of resilience within communities gives us a clue. If what is at stake is communal solidarity and selfhelp to enable adaptation to a range of disasters then poverty and inequality reduction would be an obvious and necessary target of policy and local action. But effacing this issue suggests that what is at stake is the creation of communally oriented, productive individuals and locales which can efficiently return to work after a catastrophe and minimise economic loss. This is then a communal solidarity directed towards coping with disasters. But it is also directed to communal survival under, rather than challenging of, what Miller and Rose (2008, 88) call 'advanced liberal' forms of government bolstered by the current economics and politics of austerity.
